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ABSTRACT: 
The role of the ‘ideal’ in political philosophy is currently much discussed. These debates cast useful 
light on Mill’s self-designation as ‘under the general designation of Socialist’. Considering Mill’s 
assessment of potential property-relations on the grounds of their desirability, feasibility and 
‘accessibility’ (disambiguated as ‘immediate-availability’, ‘eventual-availability’ and ;conceivable-
availability’) shows us not only how desirable and feasible he thought ‘utopian’ socialist schemes 
were, but which options we should implement. This, coupled with Mill’s belief that a socialist ideal 
should guide social reforms (as the North Star guides mariners), reveals much more clearly the 
extent of his socialist commitments (even if he thought political economists would be concerned 
with forms of individual property for some time to come). Moreover, this framework for 
assessments of ‘ideal’ institutions makes a useful contribution to an on-going contemporary 
debate. 
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Among those who have taken John Stuart Mill’s self-declared socialism1 seriously, several see it as 
a form of ‘utopian-socialism’, akin to the socialisms of Robert Owen; William Thompson; Henri 
Saint-Simon; Charles Fourier; Victor Considerant; and Louis Blanc.2 Yet, though Mill did not shy 
away from the word ‘Utopia’,3 he hardly wrote the kind of detailed description which is arguably a 
necessary criterion for ‘utopian socialism’.4 Moreover, it is cooperative-socialism which Mill calls 
‘the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the 
universal good, which it is possible at present to foresee’,5 and this is not usually understood as 
‘utopian’ (unless we think socialism can only be ‘utopian’ or ‘scientific’, which is not, itself, a helpful 
dichotomy). However, ‘utopia’ – and utopian socialism – plays an overlooked role in the content 
and development of Mill’s political philosophy.  
 Mill describes his socialist opinions as concerning ‘the ultimate prospects of humanity’;6 
his ‘ideal of ultimate improvement…would class [him] decidedly under the general designation of 
                                                          
1 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, CW I (Toronto, 1981), 239. 
2 Leslie Stephens, The English Utilitarians III (London, 1902), 224; Irving Horowitz, ‘Review: John Stuart Mill and 
French Thought’, Philosophy (1960) 35/133, 181-183 at 182; Jacob Oser, Evolution of Economic Thought (New York, 
1963), 99; Iris Wessel Mueller, John Stuart Mill and French Thought (Freeport, 1968), 170-224; John Medearis, ‘Labor, 
Democracy, Utility, and Mill’s Critique of Private Property’, American Journal of Political Science (2005) 49/1, 135-149; 
Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (London,1991), 7; Oskar Kurer, ‘J.S. 
Mill and Utopian Socialism’, The Economic Record (1992) 68/202, 222-32; William Stafford, ‘How Can a Paradigmatic 
Liberal Call Himself a Socialist? The Case of John Stuart Mill’, Journal of Political Ideologies (1998) 3/3, 325-45; Gregory 
Claeys, ‘Justice, Independence, and Industrial Democracy: The Development of John Stuart Mill’s Views on 
Socialism’, Journal of Politics (1987) 49/1, 122-147.  
3 Mill, The Claims of Labour, CW IV (Toronto, 1967), 382. 
4 David Leopold, ‘The Structure of Marx and Engels’ Considered Account of Utopian Socialism’, History of Political 
Thought (2005) 26/3, 433-66 at 446-8. 
5 Mill, Principles of Political Economy CW II and III (Toronto, 1965), 794. 
6 Mill, Autobiography, 199. 
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Socialists’;7 he was ‘far from intending’ his words ‘should be understood as a condemnation of 
Socialism, regarded as an ultimate result of human progress’;8 it is linked with ‘the ultimate 
capabilities of human nature’;9 even though ‘an entire renovation of the social fabric, such as 
contemplated by Socialism…is not available as a present resource’, it is ‘valuable as an ideal, and 
even as a prophecy of ultimate possibilities’.10 This terminology has led some to suggest that he 
‘was never a convinced Socialist’,11 and that rather than speak of a ‘conversion to Socialism’, we ought 
to recognise that Mill ‘left open the possibility that socialism would never arrive’.12 But Mill’s view 
of the role of ‘utopia’ casts doubt on this interpretation. He wrote: 
‘We should endeavour to set before ourselves the ideal 
conception…however distant, not to say doubtful, may be the hope 
of actually obtaining it [so that]…whatever is done now may if 
possible be in the direction of what is best, and may bring the actual 
fact nearer and not further off from the standard of right, at 
however great a distance it may still remain from that standard. 
Though we may only be sailing from the port of London to that of 
Hull, let us guide our navigation by the North Star’.13  
Rather than showing he was never a ‘convinced’ ‘convert’, this use of ‘ultimate’ shows Mill 
felt socialism ought to guide our current efforts at reform, however incremental, and however far 
                                                          
7 Ibid,. 239. 
8 Mill, Principles, xciii. 
9 Ibid., 214. 
10 Mill, Chapters on Socialism CW V (Toronto, 1967), 749-50. 
11 L.E. Fredman and B.L.J. Gordon, ‘John Stuart Mill and Socialism’, Mill Newsletter (1967) 3/1, 3-7 at 3. 
12 Jonathan Riley, ‘J.S. Mill’s Liberal Utilitarian Assessment of Capitalism Versus Socialism’, Utilitas (1996) 8/1, 39-71 
at 41. 
13 Mill, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform CW XIX (Toronto, 1977), 321-22. 
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we would still remain from an ‘ultimate’ standard which might, in itself, never be reached. As he 
put it:  
‘[Saint-Simonism] is the true ideal of a perfect human society; the 
spirit of which will more and more pervade even the existing social 
institutions, as human beings become wiser and better; and which, 
like any other model of unattainable perfection, everybody is the 
better for aspiring to, although it be impossible to reach it. We may 
never get to the North Star, but there is much use in turning our 
faces towards it if we are journeying northward’.14 
As I will explore below, in later life Mill’s view of the ‘true ideal of a perfect human society’ was 
no longer Saint-Simonism. However, although he thought all contemporary socialisms were 
‘necessarily imperfect…and susceptible of immense improvement’,15 his ‘ideal’ remained socialist 
– and its role in guiding contemporary reform remained the same. In this article I consider Mill’s 
critiques of socialism and possible reforms to individual property in order to map how close to the 
‘ideal’ he thought they came. By doing so, light is cast on Mill’s own ‘ideal’. Section 1 sketches the 
analytical framework Mill uses for these assessments, based on questions of ‘idealness’ in terms of 
the desirability of a scheme; the workability of a scheme; and how far distant a world would be in 
which it could practically be implemented. Section 2 considers the ‘idealness’ of the varieties of 
socialism Mill assesses in Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism. Section 3 considers 
Mill’s ‘ideal’. The article concludes by sketching some wider implications of this framework and 
role of ‘utopia’ for understanding Mill, and contemporary ideal theory.  
                                                          
14 Mill, Fontana and Prati’s Saint-Simonism in London CW XXIII (Toronto, 1986), 678. 
15 Mill, Principles, 1028. 
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1. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS. 
Mill analyses contemporary socialism according to three criteria. Firstly, he considers the 
‘attractive[ness]’ of the scheme or society described.16 That is, in the terms of the original pun, is 
the ‘utopia’ a ‘eu-topos’? He considers questions of justice and ‘meaningful equality’, including of 
the sexes;17 individuality and independence;18 ‘moral’ improvement of social ethos, harmony, and 
individual character;19 and general utility.20  I refer to these as questions of ‘desirability’.  
 Secondly, Mill considers the ‘workability’ or ‘practicability’ of institutions.21 If these 
institutions were up-and-running, would they work? Would they be stable, or collapse back into a 
system of individual property?22 Could people be motivated to do enough work under them; would 
they agree to follow the sorts of rules and regulations necessary for their on-going existence; would 
they end up starving because of over-population? Because of evident similarity to contemporary 
debate, I refer to these concerns as questions of ‘feasibility’.23  
                                                          
16 Mill, Chapters, 748. 
17 Mill, Principles, 201-203, 206-210, 758, 765-66, 775 and 793-94; Mill, Chapters, 744-45. 
18 Mill, Principles, 208-209, 758-62, 775, 793-4; Mill, Chapters, 745-46. 
19 Mill, Principles 208-209, 754-62, 775 and 793-94; Mill, Chapters, 745. 
20 Mill, Principles, 208-209, 754-57 and 793-94. 
21 Ibid, 203-207, 210-214 and 766-94; Mill, Chapters, 738-743 and 747-50.  
22 Mill, Chapters, 750. 
23 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 145; G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, 2009), 56-
57; Leopold, ‘Marx and Engels’’, 433-66, ‘A Cautious Embrace: Reflections on (Left) Liberals and Utopia’ in Ben 
Jackson and Marc Stears edited, Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden (Oxford, 2012), and ‘On 
Marxian Utopophobia’, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2016) 54/1, 111-34; Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-
Smith, ‘Political Feasibility’, Political Studies (2012) 60, 800-825 at 813.  
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 Thirdly, Mill considers whether, when, where and by whom such institutions could be 
implemented.24 He considers this in three stages. One, could the institutions be implemented 
immediately by some existing people in an existing society? In Mill’s felicitous phrase, are these 
institutions ‘available as a present resource’?25 Two, is it possible to foresee a future in which those 
institutions would be ‘available as a present resource’ which is reachable from here? Is there a story 
we can tell about how people like us, in the society we now inhabit, would end up as the kind of 
people living in improved institutions? 26 Three, is it possible to conceive of any human society for 
whom these institutions might be ‘available as a present resource’? It may not be possible to see 
the route from ‘here’ to ‘there’ – perhaps because ‘there’ is so far distant from ‘here’ that we cannot 
imagine a possible path; perhaps because ‘there’ is already in our past, a destination only reachable 
from a path not taken. For instance, Mill suggests in Principles that Saint-Simonism might be an 
available resource in societies where the majority of people think their rulers have supernatural 
powers, but these are conditions which are firmly in the past.27 For clarity (and brevity), I use the 
phrases ‘immediate-availability’, ‘eventual-availability’ and ‘conceivable-availability’ to express 
these three ideas respectively.28  
 This framework allows us to make better sense of Mill’s assessment of different 
contemporary forms of socialism, and of his repeated assertion that socialism was, or at least might 
be, the ‘ultimate’ form of human society. It also helps us understand how ‘far’ from ideal these 
schemes, and reforms of capitalism, were for Mill, and which he thought we ought to try in specific 
circumstances. It is to this assessment which I now turn.  
                                                          
24 Mill, Principles, 211, 213-214 and 769-94; Mill, Chapters, 748-750. 
25 Mill, Chapters, 750. 
26 E.g. the account given in Principles, 793-94.  
27 Ibid., 211. 
28 My thanks to Dale E. Miller for advice on improving this terminology. 
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2.  MILL’S ASSESSMENT OF SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVES. 
Mill means by the general term ‘socialism’, both ‘communism’ and ‘non-communistic socialism’.29 
He describes socialism, generally, as involving communal ownership of land and the instruments 
of production; labour directed towards the common good by democratically-elected leaders; and 
remuneration determined by some publically-acknowledged principle of justice rather than, as in 
contemporary society, ‘accident alone’.30 The difference between communism and non-
communistic socialism arises in distribution. Communists are ‘those whose scheme implies 
absolute equality in the distribution of the physical means of life and enjoyment’ whereas socialists 
‘admit inequality, but grounded on some principle…of justice or general expediency’.31  
 Mill discusses Owenite communism; Blancian communism; Saint-Simonism; Fourierism; 
cooperative socialism; and ‘the revolutionary form of socialism’ (Marxism).32 The realities of these 
schemes complicate his theoretical distinction: Blanc is a ‘Communist’, but ‘advocates equality of 
distribution only as a transition to a still-higher standard of justice, that all should work according 
to their capacity, and receive according to their wants’;33 Fourier allowed private property in 
capital.34 
More illuminating than his initial disambiguation is Mill’s statement that socialism presents 
‘a compromise with the selfish type of character formed by the present standard of morality, and 
                                                          
29 Mill, Principles, 201-210 and 775; Mill, Chapters, 737-39. 
30 Mill, Principles, 202; Mill, Chapters, 738. 
31 Mill, Principles, 203. 
32 Ibid., 202-214 and 758-794; Mill Chapters, 703-753. 
33 Mill, Principles, 203. 
34 Ibid., 210-214; Mill, Chapters, 738-39. 
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fostered by the existing social institutions’ by retaining a link between remuneration and labour.35 
That is, socialism allows for at least some harnessing of self-interest to motivate labour in a way 
which communism does not. I turn now to a consideration of Mill’s assessment of communism 
in the light of the theoretical framework sketched in Section 1 regarding desirability, feasibility, 
and availability, and then do the same for non-communistic socialism. 
 
2.1 Mill’s Assessment of Communism. 
As noted, communism involves ‘the entire abolition of private property’, and breaks the link 
between remuneration and labour, Owenite communism distributing equal shares; Blancian 
communism adopting the ‘still higher’ principle detailed above.36 Although both Owen and Blanc 
were involved with cooperation and not just intentional communities, when speaking of 
‘communism’ Mill has in mind ‘village communit[ies]…composed of a few thousand inhabitants 
cultivating in joint ownership the same extent of land which at present feeds that number of 
people, and producing by combined labour and the most improved processes the manufactured 
articles which they required’.37  
Mill thought such schemes feasible, though his earliest assessment in Principles is not 
glowing: ‘The scheme is not what is commonly meant by impracticable’.38 Members ‘might be able 
                                                          
35 Mill, Principles, 210. 
36 Ibid., 202-203. 
37 Ibid., 203. 
38 Ibid., 975. Even so, this is an improvement on his assessment in the 1820s (see Mill, Population: Proaemium, CW XXVI 
(Toronto, 1988), 286-287; Mill, Population, CW XXVI (Toronto, 1988), 287-296; Mill, Population: Reply to Thirwall, CW 
XXVI (Toronto, 1988), 296-307; Mill, Co-operation: First Speech, CW XXVI (Toronto, 1988), 308; Mill, Cooperation: 
Intended Speech, CW XXVI (Toronto, 1988), 308-313; and Mill, Cooperation: Closing Speech, CW XXVI (Toronto, 1988), 
313-325. 
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to live and hold together, without positive discomfort’.39 Even so, this ‘would be a considerable 
improvement, so far as the great majority are concerned’.40 His later assessments are somewhat 
warmer – communist schemes ‘cannot be truly said to be impracticable’41 and ‘[t]he practicability’ of 
schemes like Owen’s ‘admits of no dispute’.42 
This is not to say he thought communism would be without feasibility-related problems. 
Dismissing the worry that workers would not be motivated, and that communism would lead to 
over-population, Mill says communism would perform at least as well as capitalism, and perhaps 
better.43 But the difficulty of apportioning work equally;44 of recruiting the most-effective 
managers;45 and of maintaining internal harmony whilst centrally determining so much on which 
people hold strong personal opinions were concerns he saw as more serious.46 However, he 
insisted that ‘[f]rom these various considerations I do not seek to draw any inference against the 
possibility that Communistic production is capable of being at some future time the form of society 
best adapted to the wants and circumstances of mankind’, and that those difficulties it is fair to 
imagine, ‘though real, are not necessarily insuperable’, not being ‘problems to which human 
intelligence, guided by a sense of justice, would be inadequate’.47 Many advantages of communism 
may ‘be reached under private property’ through profit-sharing, but that does not undermine the 
feasibility of communism so long as individual characters had been sufficiently changed through 
                                                          
39 Mill, Principles, 975. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 203. 
42 Mill, Chapters, 739. 
43 Mill, Principles, 204-206; Mill, Chapters, 739-43. 
44 Mill, Principles, 206-207; Mill, Chapters, 743-45. 
45 Mill, Chapters, 739-742. 
46 Ibid., 745-46. 
47 Ibid., 746; Mill, Principles, 207. 
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moral and intellectual education, and so long as communism is introduced in a voluntarist, 
piecemeal, organic fashion and involves small-scale self-sufficient communities.48   
Mill also saw much that was desirable in that kind of communism. It was more desirable 
than contemporary capitalism: ‘the worst and most unjust arrangement which could be 
made…under a system aiming at equality, would be so far short of the inequality and injustice with 
which labour (not to speak of remuneration) is now apportioned, as to be scarcely worth counting 
in the comparison’.49 He praises communism’s commitment to female emancipation and equality;50 
consistently calls Blanc’s a ‘higher’ principle of justice even than Owen’s;51 and the kind of 
education which would be necessary to make communism feasible is a kind Mill thought of as 
desirable – i.e. as improving people’s general intelligence and their moral calibre, particularly in 
enabling them to be motivated not just by self-interest, but through a desire for the common good 
and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.52 
In Principles Mill ends his consideration of communism with the striking claim that 
‘[i[f…the choice were to be made between Communism with all its chances, and the present state 
of society with all its sufferings and injustices…all the difficulties great or small, of Communism, 
would be but as dust in the balance’.53 There is no such resounding statement in Chapters, which is 
sometimes read as taking a more negative view than Principles.54 How to weigh Chapters versus 
Principles is difficult: as Stafford rightly points out, Chapters was unfinished, and (as Miller also 
notes), it was written in 1869, yet the final, 1871, edition of Principles does not reveal a retreat from 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 202-208 and 775; Mill, Chapters, 746. 
49 Mill, Principles., 207. 
50 Ibid., 209. 
51 Ibid., 203 and 210; Mill, Chapters, 739. 
52 Mill, Chapters, 742 and 746. See also Mill, Autobiography, 241 and Mill, Letter 26, CW XII (Toronto, 1963), 31-33. 
53 Ibid. On this, see also J. Persky, The Political Economy of Progress (Oxford, 2016), 70.  
54 E.g. Dale E. Miller, ‘Mill’s “Socialism”’, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 2/2, 213-38 at 225-226. 
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the earlier position on communism.55 In neither work does Mill endorse communism as wholly 
unproblematic. But I do not think we can read Chapters as Mill fundamentally changing his position. 
Instead, Chapters is consistent with Principles, though engaging more with the threat of a new form 
of forcibly-imposed communism via revolution. In both Chapters and Principles, Owenite and 
Blancian communism are seen as desirable and feasible. 
Turning to considerations of availability, Mill saw communism as at least conceivably-
available. The ‘high standard of both moral and intellectual education’ required to make it feasible 
has been instituted before.56 Moreover, such an education could be instituted again: though this 
will take ‘successive generations…the hindrance is not in the essential constitution of human 
nature’.57 Indeed, Mill ‘reject[s] altogether the notion that it is impossible for [the necessary] 
education and cultivation…to be made the inheritance of every person in the nation’ though he is 
‘convinced that it is very difficult, and that the passage to it from our present condition can be 
only slow’.58 He ‘admit[s] the plea that in the points of moral education…only a Communistic 
association can effectually train mankind for Communism’ and says ‘[i]t is for Communism, then, 
to prove by practical experiment, its power of giving this training’.59 
In 1849, in correspondence with Harriet Taylor, Mill expresses doubts as to the eventual-
availability of communism, feeling that, though it might be true that children could be taught to 
be communists in ten years, there will be no ‘unselfish’ people to teach them, for even ‘cleverer 
people’ cannot be motivated ‘to desire’ communism.60 If he and Taylor had ‘absolute power 
                                                          
55 Stafford, ‘Paradigmatic Liberal’, 328; Miller, ‘Mill’s Socialism’, 225-226.  
56 Mill, Principles, 202 and 975-6; Mill, Chapters, 746; Mill, Autobiography, 239-241. 
57 Mill, Autobiography, 241.  
58 Mill, Chapters, 746. 
59 Ibid. 
60 This correspondence has been used to support what Claeys calls ‘the hen-pecked thesis’: that Taylor was the 
‘Socialist’, not Mill (Claeys, Mill and Paternalism (Cambridge, 2013), 36-42. Though we lack her half of the 
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tomorrow’, he adds, ‘though we could do much to improve people by good laws, and could even 
give them a very much better education than they have ever had yet, still, for effecting in our lives 
anything like what we aim at, all our plans would tail from the impossibility of finding fit 
instruments’.61  
Mill evidently changed his mind on this score, though always emphasising that the 
transition to communism – if it happened at all – would be ‘slow’, for his later writings on 
education and communism show that he thought communism not only eventually-available to 
most of society, but immediately-available to what Mill calls ‘the elite of mankind’.62 That is, those 
who already had the requisite moral and intellectual capacities to make communism immediately-
available including, Mill makes plain in Principles, those working people currently engaging in a 
disciplined pursuit of independence from the domination of capitalists through founding 
cooperatives by pooling their often meagre and very hard-won individual savings.63 (It also shows 
how Mill thought socialist ‘experiments in living’64 could help prove, and improve, their feasibility 
and availability.) 
                                                          
correspondence, we can probably say she expressed the thought that communism was eventually-available, and 
sooner, than Mill at that point believed. But we cannot say how long she held that view once she had heard Mill’s 
thoughts: certainly, the position in the 1849 edition of Principles (some parts of which Mill records as being co-
written) is that of Mill’s letters, not her supposed position (see Mill, Principles, 203-4). On the other hand, Mill’s 
position did eventually change – not just in Principles but also in Chapters, where communism is acknowledged to be 
eventually-available, even immediately-available to some. 
61 Mill, Letter 24, CW III (Toronto, 1965), 1030. 
62 Mill, Chapters, 746-8. 
63 Mill, Principles, 775-794. 
64 Mill, On Liberty, CW XVIII (Toronto, 1977), 281. 
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Mill certainly had severe doubts about communism’s desirability and feasibility in the 
1820s, when he debated the Owenites.65 Even if he thought Owen’s schemes available then, he 
did not think they were something we should attempt. And he retained some concerns regarding 
availability in the 1840s. But when we look at Mill’s later writings on communism, and view them 
through the framework for analysis sketched in Section 1, we see his mature position was that 
communism was desirable, feasible, and not only conceptually-available, but eventually-available 
to much of society, and even immediately-available to some, whose self-help efforts in cooperation 
were giving them the required moral and intellectual education.  
2.2 Mill’s Assessment of Socialism.  
Mill considers four forms of socialism in-depth: Saint-Simonism, Fourierism, revolutionary 
socialism and cooperative socialism. Here I explore his assessment of each in turn. 
2.2.i Saint-Simonism.  
Saint-Simonianism involved an unequal division of the produce; different occupations depending 
on ‘vocation or capacity’, assigned ‘by the choice of the directing authority’; remuneration by salary 
‘proportioned to the importance, in the eyes of that authority, of the function itself, and the merits 
of the person who fulfils it’.66 The ruling body ‘might be appointed by popular suffrage’, though 
the original idea was that ‘the rulers’ would be ‘persons of genius and virtue, who obtained the 
voluntary adhesion of the rest by the force of mental superiority’.67 Saint-Simonism also involved 
reform of marriage and divorce, and a commitment to equality of the sexes; healed current class 
antagonism; improved individual character; and aimed at the common good.68  
                                                          
65 Mill, Population: Proaemium, 286-287; Mill, Population, 287-296; Mill, Population: Reply to Thirwall, 296-307; Mill, Co-
operation: First Speech, 308; Mill, Cooperation: Intended Speech, 308-313; Mill, Cooperation: Closing Speech, 313-325.  
66 Mill, Principles, 210-211. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Mill, Fontana and Prati, 678-80. 
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Even when Saint-Simonism was an active force in French politics with which Mill was 
keenly engaged, he had some concerns about their utopian vision, including their over-praise of 
‘production’, and some other ‘absurd and exaggerated’ ideas.69 However, notwithstanding this, he 
called Saint-Simonism the ‘true ideal of a perfect human society’ and the ‘North Star’ of our 
endeavours in reaching social justice.70 Unlike ‘every other Utopia we ever read of…if it could be 
realised [it] would be good’.71 Though his feelings appear to have cooled over time, Mill still calls 
Saint-Simonism ‘a system of far higher intellectual pretensions’ than communism, ‘constructed 
with greater foresight of objections, and juster appreciation of them’ in 1849.72 Even in the very 
last editions of Principles, he says Saint-Simonism is ‘totally free from the objections usually urged 
against Communism; and, though…open to others…by [its] large and philosophic treatment of 
some of the fundamental problems of society and morality…may justly be counted among the 
most remarkable productions of the past and present age’.73 Overall, then, we should read Mill as 
seeing Saint-Simonism as desirable. 
Mill likened Saint-Simonism to a massive joint-stock company employing people by a 
salary ‘proportioned as far as possible to their services’.74 This was, he says, an ‘impracticable’ 
scheme ‘but the impracticality is only in degree, not in kind’ because the history of the world so far 
has been one of increasing ‘combination of labour’: ‘We have only to imagine the same progression 
infinitely continued, and a time would come when Saint-Simonism would be practicable; and if 
practicable, desirable’.75 Here we see that by ‘impracticable’ Mill did not mean infeasible – he meant 
                                                          
69 Ibid., 675. 
70 Ibid., 678. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Mill, Principles, 980-91. 
73 Ibid., 210. 
74 Mill, Fontana and Prati, 678.  
75 Ibid.  
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not immediately-available. This passage nicely illustrates how Mill thought Saint-Simonism not 
only conceivably-available in the 1830s, but eventually-available.  
This position changed by the time he came to write Principles. There, though he still thought 
it feasible, and though he says, of socialist schemes in general, that they are deserving and capable 
of trial, Saint-Simonism is best seen as conceivably-available.76 This is because it necessitated the 
belief on the part of the subjects in the almost-supernatural powers of their leaders.77 This might 
have worked in the past, but looks implausible in modern times.78 Saint-Simonism is not mentioned 
in Chapters (though it remains in the last edition of Principles, written later than Chapters). Mill’s 
mature take on it, then, is that it is desirable; feasible; and conceivably-available. 
2.2.ii Fourierism. 
Mill did not learn about Fourierism until he had already published the first edition of Principles. 
Like many of his contemporaries, he was not initially impressed, calling Fourier ‘a sort of...Owen 
who is to accomplish all things by means of cooperation & of rendering labour agreeable, & under 
whose system man is to acquire absolute power over the laws of physical nature; among other 
happy results, the sea is to be changed into lemonade’.79 However, once he started taking 
Fourierism seriously, Mill describes it ‘[t]he most skilfully combined, and with the greatest foresight 
of objections’ of all the ‘utopian’ socialisms.80 He praises Fourierism’s feminist credentials, and its 
attempt to create equality ‘not from the compression, but, on the contrary, from the largest 
                                                          
76 Mill, Principles, 210-213. 
77 Ibid., 210-14. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Mill, Letter 64, CW XII (Toronto, 1963) p.134. 
80 Ibid., 211; Mill, Chapters, 747. 
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possible development, of the various natural superiorities residing in each individual’, saying a 
practical trial is ‘to be desired’.81 He concludes his account in Chapters by saying: 
‘Altogether, the picture of a Fourierist community is both attractive 
in itself and requires less from common humanity than any other 
known system of Socialism; and it is much to be desired that the 
scheme should have that fair trial which alone can test the 
workableness of any new scheme of social life’.82 
Thus, Mill, from 1849 onwards, thought Fourierism desirable, feasible, immediately-available to 
some, and eventually-available to more.83  
2.2.iii ‘Revolutionary socialism’. 
Mill does not engage with ‘revolutionary socialism’ in early editions of Principles because this form 
of broadly Marxist socialism (though Marx was not yet so well-known that he had become 
synonymous with it), did not yet exist as a substantial political force. But by the time he came to 
write Chapters, ‘revolutionary’ socialism was both a more evident political force, and one of which 
Mill had more personal knowledge – for instance, through his correspondence with the 
Nottingham branch of the International Workingmen’s Association.84  
Revolutionary socialists, Mill says: ‘proclaim themselves content to begin by simple 
subversion, leaving the subsequent reconstruction to take care of itself…but in what mode it will, 
                                                          
81 Mill, Principles, 1028 and 213. 
82 Mill, Chapters, 748. 
83 For a more detailed consideration of Mill and Fourierism, see McCabe, ‘John Stuart Mill and Fourierism: 
‘Association’, ‘Friendly rivalry’ and Distributive Justice’, Global Intellectual History (2018).  
84 Mill, Letter 1749, CW XVII (Toronto 1972), 1910-2. This connection also shows that J. Salwyn Schapiro is not 
quite correct when he states that ‘Mill knew nothing of Marx or Marxism’ (Schapiro, ‘John Stuart Mill, Pioneer of 
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they say, be time enough afterwards to decide’.85 Though sympathising with their hatred of existing 
social evils and their impatience with the current, apparently-glacial speed of reform, and ‘finding 
much that I warmly approve’ in the ‘principles’ of the Nottingham IWA, he believed socialism had 
to be proven feasible, and felt ‘it was impossible for me to say to what extent I should concur in 
the practical measures which the association would propose in order to bring the principles into 
operation’ as these were fleshed out.86 Feasibility was best tested through small-scale experiments 
which would, in turn, aid the necessary moral revolution. If a wholescale political revolution took 
place before this moral revolution, it would end in misery and the eventual re-establishment of 
private property: if the moral revolution happened first, the political one might be rendered 
unnecessary.87  
Overall, then, revolutionary socialism was neither desirable nor feasible – in fact, one might 
read Chapters as an attempt to persuade the workers of the world not to unite in revolutionary 
action, but in different, more-peaceful reforms.88 However, it was immediately-available: indeed, 
this was its danger.  
2.2.iv Cooperative Socialism. 
Lastly, we come to cooperative socialism (‘association of the labourers among themselves’89) 
whereby the property is ‘jointly’ owned by all the owner-workers, and the principles of 
remuneration in each cooperative are to be democratically determined by the owner-workers 
themselves.90 They might pick piece-work; they might adopt Blancian principles; they might adopt 
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anything in-between: but they must not employ workers for wages, and they must not reward 
people more highly merely for exercising more power.91 The associations would compete amongst 
themselves in a spirit of ‘friendly rivalry’, and would have eradicated classes, thus improving the 
social ethos and social harmony.92 If, Mill says, women were equal partners in such schemes, the 
state of affairs in which all capital had ‘spontaneously’ become joint property and everyone worked 
in cooperative associations would be ‘the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial 
ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present to foresee’.93 As 
Persky argues, cooperation ‘makes coherent Mill’s radical reform agenda…Ultimately, a productive 
system built around worker cooperatives constitutes the radical promise of progress, the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’.94 Thus, cooperative-socialism was desirable, feasible and 
immediately-available to some, with ‘higher’ principles of justice, and a society in which everyone 
was so-employed, being desirable, feasible and eventually-achievable.  
In summary, then, Mill found all forms of socialism apart from that brought about by revolution 
and involving a centrally-planned economy, desirable. Similarly, he thought they were, bar 
revolutionary socialism, all feasible. He thought revolutionary socialism immediately-available, 
which was its danger. Saint-Simonism was conceivably-available. Cooperative socialism, 
Fourierism and Owenite and Blancian communism were immediately-available to the ‘elite of 
mankind’ (i.e. those members of the working classes already showing their capability of accessing 
such institutions ‘as a present resource’ through their heroic efforts in setting up cooperatives). All 
these latter were also eventually-available much more widely through an organic, evolutionary, but 
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plausible and foreseeable expansion of cooperation and profit-sharing, which in turn would 
generate the required moral and intellectual education.  
 
3. MILL’S ‘IDEAL’.  
The question still remains as to which of these forms of socialism (if any) Mill considered to be 
the ‘ideal’ by which we ought to navigate social reform. Here the question of availability is of little 
importance (the ‘ideal’ is not necessarily available, just as the North Star is not itself reachable), 
but questions of desirability are paramount, and questions of feasibility also relevant.95 
 As noted, in the 1830s Mill characterised Saint-Simonism as the ‘North Star’, but later he 
ceased to see it as the ‘ideal’. Above, I noted Mill’s concerns about the social ethos which might 
be generated through Saint-Simonism’s emphasis on production, as well as his concerns over its 
centralisation of power.96 We should also note that Mill categorises Saint-Simonism as a form of 
‘socialism’, and socialism necessarily involves a ‘compromise’ between reality and the ‘ideal’ – 
between the selfishness of contemporary characters and human perfection.  
From 1852, Mill calls cooperative socialism ‘the nearest approach to social justice and the 
most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present 
to foresee’.97 But this, too, is only an ‘approach’ (however ‘near’) and not the ‘ideal’ itself. Though 
it has much to commend it, like Saint-Simonism, cooperative socialism involves a ‘compromise’ 
between selfishness and the ideal. The ‘ideal’ would not involve this compromise (even if this means 
it is ultimately unachievable). What does not involve this compromise is communism.  
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 Communism, for Mill, involved the ‘highest’ principles of distributive justice – either equal 
shares or ‘from each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs’. Mill’s own nuanced 
– if brief – considerations of distributive justice help explain why he thought these principles were 
‘higher’, and therefore better, than those of any extant form of socialism, and those underpinning 
capitalism.  
Mill accepts there is a claim of justice to the full fruits of one’s own labours.98 However, 
he also thinks people have a right to subsistence purely by dint of existing; though they also have 
a duty to contribute to the costs created by their existence.99 Moreover, even when people’s 
subsistence is guaranteed, Mill felt it was unjust to reward people for natural talent or strength as 
this unfairly gives more to those who already have most.100 Further, he was concerned about the 
self-interest which was bred by current capitalism, even when recognising the justice of the 
principles ‘on which in every vindication of it which will bear the light, it is assumed to be 
grounded’ – ‘proportion between remuneration and exertion’.101 What was better was that people 
worked for ‘generous’ reasons, and that their actions (including their labour) was directed towards 
the common good.102 Blanc’s principles are ‘still higher’ than the already ‘high’ ideal of equal shares, 
then, because they not only guarantee subsistence, but do not allow inequalities through 
compromise with selfish self-interest, or further rewarding those who already have most.103   
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 These ‘higher’ principles of justice are only attainable by people with much-improved 
moral characters. Moreover, this improvement in character would also necessitate and attain much 
more that Mill considered desirable: meaningful equality, particularly between the sexes; 
independence; social harmony, an improved social ethos and individual character; and general 
utility.  
 As noted, Mill was concerned about the negative effect of communism on individuality. 
20th and 21st century concerns about communism’s deleterious effect on individuality generally 
have in mind the power of the state in Soviet-style communism. But Mill’s concern is not about 
the power of the state so much as the potentially inescapable power of public opinion in small, 
communal communities. In phrases foreshadowing On Liberty, he worries whether ‘there would 
be any asylum left for individuality of character; whether public opinion would not be a tyrannical 
yoke; whether the absolute dependence of each on all, and surveillance of each by all, would not 
grind all down into a tame uniformity of thoughts, feelings and actions’.104  
 Given this, and given he thought ‘the education which taught or the social institutions 
which required’ people to ‘renounce liberty for the sake of equality, would deprive them of one of 
the most elevated characteristics of human nature’, we might think communism ruled out as the 
‘ideal’ on the grounds of individuality, whatever Mill thought about its distributive principles and 
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other desirable elements.105 However, Mill is not sure communism will have these deleterious 
effects: ‘No doubt,’ he says, ‘this, like all the other objections to the Socialist schemes, is vastly 
exaggerated’.106 Communism would ‘promise greater personal and mental freedom than is now 
enjoyed by those who have not enough of either to deserve the name’.107   
 These concerns, however, do not apply to cooperative socialism. Mill does not seem to see 
any potential problems for individuality in cooperative socialism. Indeed, as Baum, Claeys and 
Stafford rightly note, cooperative socialism is the direct extension of Mill’s beliefs regarding 
independence, anti-paternalism and individuality to the economic sphere.108 But he did have some 
concerns regarding the justice of some distributive principles which might have been implemented 
by cooperatives (even if these would be better, because democratically-determined, than when 
imposed by an external force).  
 A combination of the ‘high’ ideals of communism, eradicating any need for compromise 
with selfishness, and flourishing individuality, then, is Mill’s ‘ideal’. And this could be achieved 
through cooperatives adopting Blancian distributive principles, which would meet the 
considerations Mill puts forward in the Autobiography regarding ‘the social problem of the future’.109 
That is, a society comprised of such cooperatives would be one ‘no longer…divided into the idle 
and the industrious’, where the rule ‘they who do not work shall not eat’ would indeed ‘be 
applied…impartially to all’ (save those whose right to subsistence without working Mill defends 
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elsewhere).110 ‘[T]he division of the produce of labour, instead of depending…on the accident of 
birth, will be made by concert, on an acknowledged principle of justice’ – indeed, on that principle 
Mill regards as ‘still higher’ than any other.111 It ‘will no longer either be, or be thought to be, 
impossible for human beings to exert themselves strenuously in procuring benefits which are not 
exclusively their own, but to be shared with the society they belong to’, both on a small-scale (i.e. 
their own cooperative) and the wider-scale of society more-generally.112 [T]he greatest individual 
liberty of action’ would have been ‘unite[d]…with a common ownership of the raw material of the 
globe, and an equal participation of all in the fruits of combined labour’.113 There would have been 
a ‘transformation…of character…in both…the labouring masses, and…their employers’, with 
‘both…classes’ having ‘learn[ed] by practice to labour and combine for generous…purposes’.114 
I argue, then, that worker-founded and run, democratically-organised cooperatives which 
had voluntarily chosen to implement Blancian principles of distribution and which were of a 
sufficiently advanced education and character to make such principles practicable, were, for Mill, 
the model we ought to use as our guide in navigating towards the ‘ideal’ society, even if this model 
turned out to only be conceptually-available. They would ‘unite’ maximal independence and 
individuality with distributive justice, improvement in moral character, and productive efficiency, 
and therefore lead to maximisation of general utility.  
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3.1 Countering Two Possible Counter-Arguments. 
One counter-argument to this claim is that Mill says he and Taylor ‘had not the presumption to 
suppose we could already foresee by what precise form of institution these objects could most 
effectually be attained’. He does not himself make an overt claim for cooperatives adopting 
Blancian principles of justice being the ‘North Star’ by which we ought to guide our reform efforts 
in the same way as he had once done for Saint-Simonism.  
But this does not undermine my claim. The North Star represents ‘true’ north – but it does 
not tell us how, precisely, to navigate from London to Hull. But from Mill’s work, we can say he 
thought that ‘[t]urning our face towards’ cooperation involving the ‘highest’ principles of 
distributive justice – and therefore combining individuality, independence, equality, distributive 
justice and productive efficiency – would be something for which ‘everybody is the 
better…although it be impossible to reach’.115 It would be a good thing, for Mill, if the ‘spirit’ of 
such institutions ‘pervade[d]…existing social institutions’.116 The precise workings of such 
institutions were not worked out by anyone, including Mill who deliberately eschewed such 
blueprint making. But a lack of ‘presumptuous’ detail does not negate the claim that there is an 
identifiable – albeit vague – ideal discernible from Mill’s writing, which ought to guide our progress 
towards reform, just as knowing one ought to head north from London to reach Hull does not 
mean one need take one prescribed route.  
A second counter-argument arises from the fact that one might think that no form of 
socialism could really have been Mill’s ‘ideal’, despite the foregoing exploration of the meaning of 
Mill’s use of ‘ultimate’ and his varying endorsements of forms of socialism. After all, he says that, 
though communism is vastly superior to contemporary capitalism, the choice is not just between 
these two options, but between ‘Communism at its best’ and ‘the regime of individual property, 
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not as it is, but as it might be made’.117 And this choice is ‘a mere question of comparative 
advantages, which futurity must determine. We are too ignorant either of what individual agency 
in its best form, or Socialism in its best form, can accomplish, to be qualified to decide which of 
the two will be the ultimate form of human society’.118  
 Given Mill’s discussion of permissible governmental action in the final book of Principles, 
and his chapter-heading in that book which reads ‘laisser-faire [sic] the general rule’ it is often 
assumed that what Mill means by ‘the regime of individual property…as it might be made’ is some 
perfected or improved form of laissez-faire capitalism, and this adds weight to the idea that Mill was 
never really a socialist.119  But this would be to misread Mill’s position.120 For one, he offers a good 
many criticisms of laissez-faire as it is usually understood.121 For another, the exceptions he supports 
to the ‘general rule’ of laisser-faire are numerous and present a vision of a ‘perfected’ regime of 
individual property which is very far from what we usually understand as laissez-faire capitalism.122  
As Persky rightly notes, ‘laissez-faire capitalism was an efficient – indeed, necessary – 
stage…Ultimately, however, it was not in itself the end state of progress’.123  
 Nor did Mill have in mind unreformed contemporary capitalism as ‘the regime of 
individual property…as it might be made’ (as his caveat of ‘not as it is, but as it might be made’ 
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shows): he thought many elements of contemporary capitalism undesirable, and that the whole 
system was, in the light of increasing working-class independence, infeasible.124 It is also plain that 
he disapproved of paternalist reforms: though sympathetic to the concern with the plight of the 
poor and the problem of increasingly violent class antagonism, Mill saw paternalism as undesirable 
and infeasible.125   
 What he did mean by ‘the regime of individual property…as it might be made’ involved 
profit-sharing; reform of land tenure and inheritance; various forms of government provision, 
including greater provision of education; fairer access to the professions; and improvement in the 
conditions of domestic servants.126 All of these reforms Mill evidently thought desirable and 
feasible, and most of them were immediately-available, at least to some, with, eventually, all 
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workers being capable of being employed in profit-sharing arrangements, save those for whom 
that was already not enough, the ‘elite of mankind’ who would be making socialist experiments, 
for instance in cooperation.127  
 But in later passages in Principles to the one contrasting ‘Communism at its best’ with 
‘regime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made’128, Mill clearly shows how these 
reforms to capitalism would ‘spontaneously’ transform into a form of cooperative socialism.129 
From there the people of the future might decide to transform further into small, communist 
villages, but their starting point would not be a capitalist one.  
 Miller has argued that, given what Mill says in Liberty about different ways of life suiting 
different people, we should expect this organic, voluntarist process to arrive at ‘a “patchwork” 
economy in which capitalistic and socialistic enterprises exist side by side’ rather than a wholly-
cooperative economy.130 I don’t disagree that this might indeed be the outcome of spontaneity, 
even in the very long run: perhaps some people will never be motivated in the way Mill suggests 
they might to work not for private gain but the common good. Similarly, Riley argues that Mill 
‘left open the possibility that socialism would never arrive’ – and I agree that Mill is not predictive 
or prescriptive.131 Kurer notes what he considers a ‘significant change in outlook’ in the 1860s, 
when Mill ‘began to believe that a complete transition to socialism was not really necessary in order 
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to achieve his social aim’.132 He bases this argument on a letter Mill wrote where he said that, to 
eradicate class antagonism, ‘it is not necessary that cooperation should be universal’ but ‘only very 
frequent’ and the claim that a significant change occurs in Principles from 1862.133 In the 1850s, Mill 
had written that labourers would form associations with capitalists ‘temporarily, and in some cases’, 
while ‘in other cases, and finally in all’ they would form associations among themselves.134 As 
‘temporarily’ was later removed, and ‘perhaps’ added before ‘finally’ from 1867, Kurer argues that 
Mill no longer thought society would, or would need to, transition to socialism to achieve his ideal. 
However, eradication of class antagonism, though an important goal for Mill, does not entirely 
encapsulate his ‘ideal’, or why he supported cooperation. The changes to a part of Principles where 
Mill makes what are always tentative predictions about the future seems to reflect as much his 
changing view as to the speed at which society might transition (that is, whether, and to how many, 
socialism is not only ‘available as a present resource’, but is one which will be utilised) than to 
affect whether such a transition would be necessary to achieve the ‘ideal’. Moreover, the direction 
of the change is still towards socialism (the main issue of this article), even if – like with the North 
Star itself – society never reaches it. (And, as Kurer himself notes, ‘in the other passages his old 
prediction still stands’ in the same, later, editions.135) I concur with Persky when he writes of ‘Mill’s 
conviction that the laissez-faire capitalism of his day…would ultimately be replaced by an economy 
built on a more cooperative base’, and argue that not only did Mill think such ‘developments 
possible and even likely’, he also thought them desirable.136   
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Though in 1845 Mill called reforms which involved ‘raising the labourer from the mere 
receiver of hire – a mere bought instrument in the work of production, having no residuary interest 
in the work itself – to the position of being, in some sort, a partner in it’ his ‘Utopia’,137 in Principles 
and the Autobiography profit-sharing is no longer Mill’s ‘Utopia’. Rather, cooperative-socialism was, 
at the very least, ‘the nearest approach to social justice’, and there were even-better options 
including, as shown above, cooperation adopting Blancian principles of distributive justice.  
Mill might not have been certain that there would be the whole-scale transformation he 
eulogises in Principles, but that does not mean he did not hope a certain form of it would. Nor is 
his reluctance to favour the immediate, universal transformation of society into small, self-
supporting communist communities (which would, as he notes, involve ‘seizing on the existing 
capital, and confiscating it for the benefit of the labourers’, and which he never fully endorsed 
because of his concerns over individuality138) over gradual reform of individual property a sign that 
he did not also hope this gradual reform would, ‘honestly, and by a kind of spontaneous process’ 
become a form of socialism as closely approximating the ideal as proved expedient. We ought to 
take seriously the thought that a socialist ideal was directing and informing Mill’s desire for reform 
of individual property, showing the way it ought to go even if he remained unsure we would ever 
really get there. 
 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF ‘UTOPIA’ IN MILL’S 
THOUGHT. 
Understanding the role of ‘utopia’ or the ‘ideal’ in Mill’s thought gives us a new way of 
understanding his ‘utopian socialism’. That is, not only did he endorse experiments in specific 
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forms of utopian socialism in the here-and-now, but the ‘North Star’ by which he thought we 
ought to navigate social reform was a form of socialism. This was not identical to any particular 
form of utopian socialism, but certainly encapsulated Blancian principles of distributive justice as 
well as more-generally avowed principles of social harmony; working for the common good; 
independence; and female emancipation, alongside Mill’s long-standing commitment to 
maximising opportunities for ‘the free development of individuality’ and general utility. 
Cooperatives (and particularly producer-cooperatives), then, democratically run by the workers 
themselves, and preferably adopting Blancian principles of distributive justice, are Mill’s ‘ideal’.  
That socialism was the ‘ultimate’ in social improvement and human progress is not a sign 
of Mill’s lack of real engagement with socialism – he did not think it so far-off as to be remote 
from questions of immediate reform, even if achievement of full-blown socialism was ‘remote’ in 
time from where he stood. Rather, it had a direct role in helping us navigate reform of 
contemporary regimes – socialism might have been as remote as Polaris, but we ought still to use 
it to guide our navigation, as Mill says, be it only in order to travel safely from London to Hull.  
 Moreover, Mill’s assessment of the desirability, feasibility and availability of different forms 
of socialism ought to impact how we understand Mill’s radicalism concerning political, social and 
economic reform. They also have wider implications within his political theory, showing there is a 
stronger emphasis than is sometimes realised in his work on distributive justice; egalitarianism; 
working-class independence; social harmony; and the common good. I have shown elsewhere how 
this has implications for how we understand his feminism and the idea of ‘perfect equality’ between 
the sexes.139 But this new way of seeing his view of a socialist ‘ideal’ guiding social reform suggests 
we ought to pay more attention to his writing on education, religion, historical change, and perhaps 
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also the social role of poets who posit the ends toward which we ought to aim, whilst scientists 
find us a route there.140 It also means we ought to reconsider some of the received wisdom on 
Mill’s view of democracy; his ‘elitism’; his perfectionism; and his liberalism, including the meaning 
and application of the harm principle. A socialist ‘ideal’ guiding this ‘paradigmatic liberal’141 casts 
both liberalism and socialism in a new light. It also raises interesting questions of the extent to 
which Mill thinks we can be made to benefit others (rather than just prevented from harming them 
in the negative sense of causing damage to their interests through our actions); to what extent 
taxation counts as a ‘harmful’ burden, and why; and the emphasis he places on the good done to 
society more generally by apparently wholly-individual goods such as freedom of expression.  
The framework I argue we can see in Mill for analysing ‘ideal’ theories in terms of 
desirability, feasibility, and three kinds of availability also has wider implications for the 
contemporary debate regarding ‘ideal’ theory – or at least for important subsections of that debate. 
I do not mean to say that just knowing Mill thought the ‘ideal’ could play this guiding role in 
immediate reform and political philosophy will persuade anyone who is currently unconvinced 
that it can, indeed, do that. But his ‘North Star’ metaphor, though expressing a controversial 
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view,142 is a useful one (indeed, Simon Caney opened a chapter on ideal theory with this very quote 
from Mill).143   
A similar tripartite schema to the one discernible in Mill is already to be found in the work 
of Erik Olin Wright, Alan Buchanan and David Leopold.144 Disambiguating between these terms 
– and particularly separating out immediate-, eventual- and conceivable-accessibility – is helpful in 
clarifying the debate. Firstly, it allows us to get a clearer idea of what a particular author means and 
where they might be mistaken (perhaps their scheme is feasible, but not as accessible as they think). 
Secondly, it allows us to better-understand the focus of critiques, and make more apposite ones – 
accusations of inaccessibility or infeasibility, for instance, can be irrelevant to some forms of 
‘utopia’ where the author makes no claim apart from to desirability. Thirdly, it allows us to better 
understand what, precisely, is ‘ideal’ about an ‘ideal’ theory; what sorts of facts about the world it 
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recognises as constraints; what kinds of ‘compromises’ with reality it is making, and why; and how 
it might, or might not, have reference for actual political reform, and in what ways. 
This is evidently only a very brief sketch of the use Mill’s framework might be put to in 
clarifying, and furthering, contemporary discussions in political theory regarding ‘ideal’ theory, 
though the foregoing discussion of Mill’s assessment of ‘utopian’ socialism fleshes out a little more 
what using this schema might look like, and deliver, in practice. Even such a brief sketch, however, 
shows that understanding the role of ‘utopia’ in Mill’s political philosophy, through his metaphor 
of it being the ‘North Star’, not only reveals a number of interesting things regarding the content 
and development of his political philosophy, but has useful implications for contemporary political 
theory and the ongoing debate regarding the role of the ‘ideal’. It is an aspect of Mill’s theory of 
social progress, and his preferred social reforms, which would repay much more attention.145 
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